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Grease or Sand  
in the Wheels  
of Democracy? The market 
for lobbying in New Zealand
What is the nature of the market for political lobbying in New Zealand? Is our lobbying 
grease in the wheels of a well-functioning 
democracy – adding to overall societal 
efficiency – as its supporters suggest? Or 
is lobbying sand in the wheels, by wasting 
resources in buying redistribution from 
one social group to another and damaging 
the social fabric essential for a well-
functioning democratic mixed economy, 
as opponents of lobbying believe? And, 
should we regulate lobbying in New 
Zealand, and why?
Broadly, lobbying is any effort by 
individuals or collectives to directly 
influence decisions of legislators and public 
officials outside elections. So defined, 
lobbying is an important element of 
political participation outside the voting 
booth. This article focuses more narrowly 
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on the local market for lobbying. Market 
lobbying occurs via the purchase of the 
services of a profit-making lobbying 
intermediary lobbying for a third party. 
Market lobbying also arises where a body, 
such as a corporation, a trade federation 
or peak business organisation, a trade 
union federation or a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), hires a person and 
allocates their time to lobbying activity.
When analysing a market, the usual first 
port of call for developing an understanding 
is industry statistics. However, such data 
does not exist for lobbying. Statistics New 
Zealand industry data does not contain an 
exclusive industry category for political 
lobbying intermediaries; the industry is too 
small. Most intermediary lobbyists are 
probably included as management advice 
and related consulting services. The market 
is also too diffuse. For those corporates that 
directly lobby government, their lobbying 
activity will be included as measured 
output in their disparate industries. 
Additionally, data on NGO, trade union 
and business organisation lobbying activity 
is not available as such.
In many countries, the regulation of 
lobbyists provides considerable informa-
tion with which to examine the lobbying 
market. While this has not resulted in a 
definitive overseas answer to the grease 
versus sand question, it provides 
information pertinent to addressing the 
issue to the public, and, via a more trans-
parent system, automatically reduces the 
amount of sand in the system. By contrast, 
lobbying is unregulated in New Zealand. A 
Lobbying Disclosure Bill was introduced 
in Parliament in 2012 by the Green Party, 
but it was unsuccessful, with the general 
view being that it was an ill-considered and 
poorly crafted legislative response 
(Edwards, 2018b). The downstream 
consequence of an absence of regulation is 
an ongoing lack of public information on 
the local market.
However, various sources of 
information can be utilised to cast light on 
the local lobbying market, allowing a 
structured discussion of whether it 
provides grease for or is sand in the wheels 
of New Zealand democracy, if not anything 
approaching a definitive conclusion. There 
are a number of media articles on aspects 
of the lobbying industry (e.g. Dudding, 
2011; Walters, 2017; Edwards, 2017, 2018a, 
2018b; Barton Deakin, 2016; Secombe, 
2015). There are commentaries by 
politicians (e.g. Mallard, 2003). There are 
several pieces of postgraduate student or 
academic research (Williams, 2014; Tyler, 
2015; Strong and Tyler, 2017), as well as a 
useful broader consideration of vested 
interests, including lobbying, by Ellie 
Argyle and political commentator Colin 
James (Argyle and James, 2014). There are 
several investigative works alleging 
egregious behaviour by lobbyists (Hager 
and Burton, 1999; Hager, 2002, 2012). 
There is one policy article by a professional 
lobbyist (Unsworth, 2014). Information on 
some lobbyists is available from a list of 
access cards to Parliament issued by the 
speaker of the House. There is online 
information provided by lobbying 
companies to promote themselves to 
potential clients. Finally, there is a body of 
theory and empirical evidence on lobbying 
markets from overseas. It is to this 
international literature to which we first 
turn.
International literature on lobbying
There is a vast international literature on 
lobbying from a wide variety of disciplinary 
perspectives. The surface of this literature 
can be scratched here only, and our focus 
is on the economic literature, which is 
based on a rational choice paradigm which, 
while delivering insights (e.g. Grossman 
and Helpman, 2001), may not be the most 
appropriate lens through which to consider 
lobbying. As overseas information comes 
from different political and economic 
environments, their conclusions must be 
applied with care to New Zealand. Yet that 
information is far from irrelevant. 
There are several core theories in the 
international literature on the market for 
lobbying. The first theory is that vested 
interests directly lobby policymakers with 
money to generate political change which 
rewards their bottom lines (Olson, 1965; 
Tollison, 2014). Such ‘rent seeking’ lobbying 
is entirely social sand: it wastes society’s 
resources. A second theory suggests that 
vested interests lobby policymakers with a 
mix of private information and money (De 
Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Money 
either signals the credibility of their 
information or buys access to policymakers. 
This form of lobbying may be a mixture of 
grease and sand, if the private information 
is of social value. A third theory suggests 
that vested interests with similar objectives 
to policymakers support policymakers to 
allow them to fulfil more of their shared 
objectives (Groll and McKinley, 2015). 
Again, this form of lobbying may be a mix 
of grease and sand.
While the empirical work arising out of 
the rational choice paradigm has been 
unable to determine the extent to which 
lobbying generates social value, or has 
chosen not to address these questions 
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001, p.4), it has 
established a number of important 
empirical regularities about lobbying. 
While many of these stylised facts are 
unsurprising, it is valuable to have them 
confirmed by systematic study. These 
empirical regularities, for the United States, 
are as follows (all from De Figueiredo and 
Richter, 2014). First, lobbying spending is 
significantly more sizeable – five times 
larger – than private funding of political 
parties. Second, businesses account for the 
vast majority – 84-86% – of lobbying 
spending. In contrast, issue–ideology 
groups, such as environmental groups, 
comprise a small share: between 2% and 
7% of spending. Corporate lobbying is not 
cancelled out by the countervailing power 
Empirical researchers have had limited 
success in identifying whether lobbyists 
are successful because of what they 
know – their knowledge base – or who 
they know – their connections.
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of issue–ideology groups. Third, large 
corporations are more likely to lobby 
independently than smaller corporations, 
and they tend to continue lobbying over 
time. Fourth, lobbying increases when 
there is a larger financial stake for the 
organised interest. A fifth fact is that 
lobbyists target two sorts of politicians: the 
powerful agenda setters, and those 
wavering at the margins who can most 
easily be swayed.
Empirical researchers have had limited 
success in identifying whether lobbyists are 
successful because of what they know – 
their knowledge base – or who they know 
– their connections. The evidence suggests 
both factors are operating (De Figueiredo 
and Richter, 2014). Lastly, a large body of 
empirical research shows that lobbying 
generally generates positive returns to the 
lobbyer (Borisov, Goldman and Gupta, 
2015; Hadani, Bonardi and Dahan, 2017). 
Lobbyists and parliamentary access
Who has swipe card access to Parliament, 
other than staff and MPs, also allows 
some insights into lobbying, providing 
some, albeit imperfect, information 
on some market participants and their 
sectoral distribution. Here we consider 
this data and the qualitative implications 
of its limitations. The numbers with card 
access are small and those who appear 
to be lobbyists is smaller. However, the 
number of lobbyists grew rapidly from 
12 in 2012, to 41 people in July 2017 
(see Figure 1). Whether this represented 
industry growth, or simply higher rates 
of acquisition of cards, is unclear. In 2003 
MP Trevor Mallard claimed that ‘[i]n the 
many years I have spent in Parliament, I 
have noticed a growth in lobbying. This 
growth is likely to continue. Lobbying as 
a practice and a discipline is going to get 
more sophisticated and more common’, 
and he repeated this view in 2015 (Tyler, 
2015, p.18). In 2015 another long-
serving MP, Peter Dunne, reported that 
lobbying activity had shrunk, but agreed 
with Mallard that it had become more 
sophisticated in its methods (ibid., p.19). 
After the 2017 election, the new speaker 
of the House reduced numbers with card 
access. Lobbyists currently make up fewer 
than half of those with cards; 22 of those 
with cards appear to act as lobbyists. In 
terms of the organisations they represent, 
their current number and distribution are 
as follows:
· seven holders (32%) represent 
corporations;
· seven (32%) are intermediary 
lobbyists;
· two (9%) represent industry bodies 
(businesses);
· five (23%) represent trade unions 
– either the NZCTU or the PSA;
· one (5%) is an incorporated society 
(the New Zealand Taxpayers’ Union).
By way of comparison with the card 
data, Table 1 shows lobbyist Mark 
Unsworth’s impressionistic estimates of 
market share of lobbying by sector, next to 
his European Union figures. In terms of 
the broad dominance by corporations and 
their proxies, the access card data looks 
similar to Table 1, and the local dominance 
of market lobbying by business interests is 
also similar to the international empirical 
facts considered above. However, 
Unsworth’s data suggests a stronger 
representation of NGO lobbying in New 
Zealand compared to overseas.
A key characteristic common to all 
corporations with cards is their size, again 
consistent with the international literature. 
Large companies whose bottom line can 
be significantly influenced by central 
government regulations and policies have 
a strong incentive to lobby. If they do a 
considerable amount, it is rational to 
employ a person who specialises in this task, 
rather than purchasing lobbying services 
from an intermediary (although 
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Figure 1: Number and distribution of lobbyists and non-lobbyists with swipe card 
access to Parliament, 2012 - 2017 
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Table 1: Market shares of lobbying
New Zealand (estimated guess) European Union
Corporates 26% 13%
Business Associations and Unions 20% 10%
Consultants (intermediaries) 18% 15%
NGOs 18% 13%
Local government 7% N/A
Iwi 5% N/A
Government funded advocacy 5% N/A
Trade Federations N/A 35%
Regional representation N/A 8%
International Organisations N/A 5%
Think Tanks N/A 1%
Source: Unsworth, 2014
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corporations may also do this). 
Corporations with an employee with an 
access card currently include Air New 
Zealand, Fonterra, Chorus and Westpac. 
These people have roles as directors or 
managers of ‘external relations’, ‘com-
munications’ or ‘public affairs’; many of 
them have previous political experience in 
different guises.1
Specialist lobbying firms – inter-
mediaries – also appear to be an important 
part of the market. These firms provide 
lobbying services for multiple clients. Who 
these clients are is unclear, and it is 
unknown how much the firms are paid and 
to what extent clientele engage in one-off 
transactions or repeat business. However, 
c l ients  are  a lmost  cer ta inly 
disproportionately weighted towards the 
business sector. Well-known firms such as 
Saunders Unsworth, Busby Ramshaw Grice 
Ltd and Boag Allen SvG all have employees 
with cards. Many of these specialist 
lobbyists also have extensive experience 
within the political system.
The organisations representing 
industries with representatives on the list 
are peak organisations whose activity is 
affected regularly by regulations and 
legislation. A significant number of trade 
unionists are also on the list. It is unclear 
whether union representatives on the list 
are full-time lobbyists.
The card list suggests that a relatively 
small lobbying market exists in New 
Zealand. Indeed, the established wisdom is 
that the market is both relatively small and 
unimportant (see, for example, Walters, 
2017). In order to contextualise this 
conjecture, the per capita number of 
lobbyists in the United States and Australia 
is of relevance. In 2016 the United States 
had 11,143 active lobbyists for a population 
of 323 million.2 If New Zealand had a 
similar per capita proportion, there would 
be about 164 local lobbyists. Australia has 
554 registered lobbyists currently and a 
population of about 24 million.3 Having 
an Australian per capita figure here would 
mean about 108 lobbyists. 
The card data suggests that the New 
Zealand lobbying market is roughly 13% 
the size of the United States’ and 20% the 
size of Australia’s. However, the access card 
list, while giving an approximation of the 
distribution of institutions engaging in 
lobbying, has several important deficiencies 
as a data source for the number of lobbyists 
employed. What does it miss? First, not all 
professional employees of a lobbying 
company have swipe card access. For 
example, according to their website 
Saunders Unsworth has five professional 
staff, but only two have cards. A further 
major deficiency is that it does not include 
some firms known to be part of the 
lobbying market. Lobbying firms that do 
not have staff currently on the list but have 
had previously include Silvereye 
Communications (employing eight 
people), Dart Government Relations (two 
people) and Acumen Republic (12). Taking 
into account firms previously with card 
access and still operating increases the 
market by around ten firms and by a much 
larger number of lobbyists.
The true size of the market is even 
larger. There are many lobbying firms and 
communications agencies which have 
never had access cards. An internet search 
for ‘government relations firms nz’ shows 
many such firms, including Exceltium, 
Boyd Public Relations and Adroite. And 
there are a number of recent new entrants 
to the market, including Barton Deakin 
and Hawker Britton.
Other significant sectors of the lobbying 
market are not represented. Many major 
law firms provide lobbying services (such 
as Buddle Findlay, Simpson Grierson and 
Johnston Lawrence). Chen Palmer, a 
leading specialist public law firm, has never 
had card access to Parliament but provides 
clients with services which most likely 
include lobbying (Chen Palmer, 2018).
Another sector absent from the list is 
NGOs. These organisations are often a 
significant lobbying presence during the 
legislative process. One explanation for this 
absence is that NGOs gain political 
influence through methods other than 
parliamentary meetings. How relatively 
important NGOs are is unclear, and it may 
be that Unsworth has overestimated the 
extent of NGO lobbying.
The card list is also not fully 
representative of the market because MPs 
can be lobbied outside Parliament. 
Lobbyists can use their contacts to instigate 
meetings or conversations with politicians 
without needing to regularly enter 
Parliament. Paid people can lobby 
government through phone calls, email, 
letters, and oral or written submissions. 
Thus, the number of paid lobbyists is likely 
to be by an order of magnitude larger than 
the parliamentary access card data suggests. 
Overall, the New Zealand lobbying market 
may more closely resemble that of Australia, 
for example, than New Zealanders probably 
like to believe.
Additionally, the trend suggested by the 
size of the list of people with cards creates 
the impression that local lobbying has been 
through a boom–bust cycle. However, this 
perception is probably inaccurate. It is 
difficult to effectively gauge growth in the 
lobbying industry, but it is unlikely to be 
decreasing in size (as discussed above). 
Indeed, an experienced observer suggests 
that it is growing (Edwards, 2017, 2018b), 
a view supported by evidence of recent new 
entrants to the industry. 
How do specialist lobbyists operate?
Based on their websites, firms offering 
lobbying services appear to be fairly 
uniform in how their services are structured 
and presented to customers. All lobbying 
firms that have previously had card access 
All lobbying firms that have previously 
had card access to Parliament consist 
of small teams of between one and a 
dozen or so employees, with one or two 
support staff and the bulk of staff being 
professionals. 
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to Parliament consist of small teams of 
between one and a dozen or so employees, 
with one or two support staff and the bulk 
of staff being professionals. As already 
noted, many lobbyists have previous work 
experience within government (Tyler, 2015, 
pp.13–14). The Frank Bold Foundation 
suggests that ‘the single most valuable tool 
any lobbyist has is their contacts with and 
links to politicians and decision-makers’ 
(Kwiatkowski, 2016). This experience 
is a selling point across all lobbying 
firms. Evidently, these ex-government 
employees maintain their contacts inside 
government once they leave, and cultivate 
their relationships to deliver policy results 
for clients. For some, this maintenance is 
aided by refreshing of their connections 
via revolving door appointments, from 
lobby organisations to political staff and 
back (Edwards, 2018a). Some lobbyists 
make their way in from the other direction: 
current National Party MP Chris Bishop 
and former National Party MP Todd 
Barclay were both lobbyists before entering 
Parliament (Emanuel, 2018).
Another notable characteristic of the 
market is that not all firms solely offer 
lobbying services. Many firms also offer 
public relations, public law, strategic 
communications or crisis management as 
services. Indeed, perhaps to avoid the 
public stigma of ‘lobbying’, firms tend to 
avoid describing their work as such. Instead 
they tactfully choose to describe their work 
using terms such as ‘government relations’, 
‘influencing policy’ or ‘advocacy’. 
Most firms operate across the political 
spectrum. However, if one takes Adam 
Smith’s famous dictum ‘the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market’ 
seriously, the recent market entry of 
partisan lobby firms Barton Deakin and 
Hawker Britton may be a further indication 
of the growth of the local lobbying industry, 
as it is now large enough to sustain left–
right specialisation. Although their 
entrance into the market may signal a 
swing towards a partisan lobbying model 
more closely resembling the American or 
Australian markets, only time will tell if it 
is successful. 
Current charge-out rates for lobbyists 
are unclear, but casual charge-out rates 
were reported as being in the vicinity of 
$400 per hour or $3200 per day in 2011, 
which suggests that comparatively high 
levels of remuneration are common 
(Dudding, 2011). Pay rates, billable hours, 
overheads and hence profitability are 
unclear. 
What lobbyists actually do on a day-to-
day basis to earn their coin and who they 
do it for is not transparent (see Tyler, 2015, 
pp.33–4 for a discussion of the possible 
range of activities which may be part of 
lobbying). Indications are that most 
clientele are businesses (Dudding, 2011). 
Mai Chen, a public lawyer who prefers not 
to identify as a lobbyist, says that lobbyists 
offer translation services between two 
groups, public policymakers and businesses, 
which speak different languages (Dudding, 
2011; see also Emanuel, 2018). From this 
perspective, a large proportion of the work 
lobbyists do is grease, improving 
information provided to public officials. 
The translator metaphor raises a question 
of justice: who can and can’t afford to pay 
for ‘translation services’? And why, if 
translation is so important, do public 
servants, on the other side of the divide, 
not hire such translators for all citizens, 
rather than only those who can afford 
them?
Due to the lack of regulation, it is 
difficult to know both who lobbyists act for, 
and whether lobbyists behave ethically. 
Investigative journalist Nicky Hager has 
shed light on the inner workings of 
government by detailing cases where 
lobbyists, public officials and organisations 
have worked together to coordinate 
misleading public relations campaigns: this 
is pure sand (see also Tyler, 2015, p.17). 
Hence, the claim that lobbyists always act 
in the public interest is demonstrably 
incorrect. The issue is how much of such 
behaviour occurs relative to socially useful 
‘translation’ services, and how damaging 
the former is relative to the latter.
Should New Zealand regulate lobbying?
The OECD has advocated developing 
non-reactive and coherent regulatory 
approaches to lobbying in order to 
maintain and enhance public trust in 
the democratic process (OECD, 2009). 
The above discussion has examined the 
limited information on local lobbying. 
Acknowledging its limitations, it does 
not support the notion that the lobbying 
market in New Zealand is sui generis. 
Given what we know about local lobbying, 
is there then any strong reason why 
New Zealand should not follow OECD 
recommendations and implement well-
considered, transparency-enhancing 
reforms? 
Market-based lobbying is an area of 
human engagement where two opposing 
values come into contact and thus into 
conflict. The first value is that of the market, 
where one dollar equals one vote, and 
where dollars are unequally distributed 
across the population, local and 
international. The second is that of 
democratic citizenship, where, ideally, one 
adult citizen of a nation state has one vote 
and votes are equally distributed across the 
voting population (or, more broadly, hours 
available for non-market lobbying activities 
are roughly equally distributed across 
citizens).
There are further contextual factors in 
this conflict that are important. There has 
Investigative journalist Nicky Hager 
has shed light on the inner workings 
of government by detailing cases 
where lobbyists, public officials and 
organisations have worked together to 
coordinate misleading public relations 
campaigns: this is pure sand ...
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been a worldwide rise in wealth inequality 
and shift in the functional distribution of 
income towards corporate profits in recent 
times (Piketty, 2015). This shift has also 
been taking place locally (Rosenberg, 2018). 
At the same time, an increasingly 
authoritarian and kleptocratic China is 
flexing its growing economic muscle in 
sophisticated efforts to influence domestic 
political processes, including in New 
Zealand (Brady, 2017).4 Hence, lobbying 
activities – by increasingly wealthy 
individuals, by increasingly profitable local 
and multinational corporate entities and 
by increasingly anti-democratic nation 
states – are coming into growing conflict 
with notions of democratic citizenship. At 
the same time, with union membership in 
New Zealand declining from 42.9% of the 
workforce in 1991 to 17.7% in 2016, 
organised labour’s countervailing lobbying 
power has been significantly eroded relative 
to the corporate sector (Ryall and 
Blumenfeld, 2017). These shifts in power 
have intensified, and likely will continue to 
exacerbate the ongoing conflict between 
market values and democratic citizenship. 
There are good reasons to believe that 
lobbying may directly throw sand into the 
wheels of society, as well as indirectly 
undermining values underpinning 
democratic citizenship, and these problems 
are going to be larger in the absence of 
transparency. There are also reasons for 
believing that these problems are likely to 
become worse over time. Hence, action on 
these matters today is likely to be easier 
than action tomorrow, as growing vested 
interests will make stronger efforts to hide 
lobbying activities that are privately 
beneficial but socially damaging. 
Low compliance cost approaches which 
provide the raw material for a better 
informed democratic citizenship and do 
not impose high costs on legitimate 
lobbying are likely to be the most 
appropriate policy responses. The OECD 
has recommended significant change in 
this area, change which occurs in a 
considered manner, unprompted by the 
heat of major scandal (OECD, 2009). 
Recent Green Party commitments to 
publish details of ministerial diaries and 
receipt of perks are to be applauded (Cook, 
2018). There is no reason why such public 
disclosures should not be enforced by law 
for all elected members of Parliament, as 
representatives of the people. Extension of 
this form of transparency to elected local 
government officials is also desirable.
In addition, it is time to again consider 
a register of lobbyists and their clients, 
adoption of a formal code of conduct along 
the lines of that in Australia, and regular 
collection and publication of data on who 
spends what on market lobbying. Again, 
this form of policy response is a relatively 
low compliance cost measure which makes 
the process more transparent, and thus 
more consistent with principles of 
democratic citizenship. 
The publication of ministerial diaries, 
and the creation of a register of lobbyists 
and their clients and publication of the 
value of their spending would provide the 
public with a body of pertinent information 
to enable them to better understand the 
decisions made by their elected 
representatives. Transparency will help 
citizens to better judge for themselves 
whether lobbying is socially valuable grease 
or anti-social sand in the democratic 
wheels.
Some level of regulation of the lobbying 
industry would also discourage unethical 
behaviour. Given New Zealand’s high levels 
of transparency and relative lack of 
corruption (Transparency International, 
2016), some might question whether even 
light-handed regulation of the lobbying 
market is necessary. One view is that 
regulation is unnecessary, because lobbyists 
are self-regulating and ethical (Dudding, 
2011; Emanuel, 2018). Neale Jones, lobbyist 
for Hawker Britton, believes that because 
Wellington is a ‘small town’, lobbyists can’t 
get away with what he calls a ‘breach of 
faith’. Barry Saunders of Saunders 
Unsworth agrees, again seeing the small 
industry as self-policing. Jones insists that 
he has rejected clients in the past on ethical 
grounds (Emanuel, 2018). Barton Deakin’s 
website includes an ‘Ethics’ page, which 
states that the firm ‘acts in the broader 
public interest in all its dealings with clients 
and governments’ (Barton Deakin, 2017). 
Ethics statements are uncommon on other 
lobbyist websites. The insistence by 
lobbyists that they act ethically and that 
their industry is effectively self-regulating 
can be seen, not mutually exclusively, as 
honest, unbiased observation, self-
interested business protection or cognitive 
dissonance about what they are doing. The 
lack of industry transparency means that 
separating the signal from the noise in 
these claims is impossible.
However, the creation of low 
compliance cost regulation, with a strong 
transparency focus, would likely not be 
strongly objected to by those within the 
industry. In the report of the government 
administration select committee regarding 
the 2012 Lobbying Disclosure Bill, it was 
noted that most of the 103 submissions 
received ‘supported [the bill’s] intent of 
enhancing trust in the integrity and 
impartiality of democracy and political 
decision-making by bringing more 
transparency to political lobbying’ 
(Government Administration Committee, 
2013). Furthermore, lobbyists Jenna 
Raeburn and Neale Jones are not opposed 
to a register similar to those in Australia 
and Canada, since their firms’ Australian 
operations have not been negatively 
affected by the mandatory register of 
lobbyists and their clients (Emanuel, 2018). 
Lobbying may be grease in the wheel of 
politics, or it may be sand, or – perhaps 
inevitably – it may be a complex mixture 
of both. Although this study has produced 
some idea of the nature of the lobbying 
market, it is still unclear who lobbyists 
Given New Zealand’s high levels 
of transparency and relative lack of 
corruption ... some might question 
whether even light-handed regulation of 
the lobbying market is necessary ...
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work for and how they act, with little hard 
evidence available to illuminate the true 
nature of the industry. The key point 
uncovered is that citizens lack convincing 
evidence for sand or grease. This is why 
regulation is needed – to shine a brighter 
light on a currently shadowy industry 
which has significant long-term potential 
to corrode the integrity of the democratic 
process. The aim of regulation would also 
be to contribute positively to making the 
industry more about grease and less about 
sand. With multiple stakeholders, as well 
as the OECD, in agreement that well-
designed regulation is necessary, the 
question must surely be: why not? 
1 Information was obtained by viewing the LinkedIn pages of 
lobbyists who have been, or currently are, on the swipe card 
access list. Pages accessed 15 February 2018. 
2  From https://www.statista.com/statistics/257340/number-
of-lobbyists-in-the-us/, downloaded 20 March 2018.
3  From http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/who_register_lobbyists.cfm, 
downloaded 20 March 2018.
4  In this context, note that Saunders Unsworth advertise 
their services in a Chinese language section: see http://www.
sul.co.nz/page/chinese-section.aspx. Whether they have 
clientele from China, as opposed to Chinese New Zealanders, 
and if so who they are and what they may be lobbying about 
is unknown. Silvereye also appear to have an advertised 
presence directed at China: see http://www.silvereye.co.nz/
about-us/ (accessed 20 March 2018).
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